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Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, 
vol. 3, p. 37)  
 
In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill 
conceived of the certainty of inductive generalizations and to offer a 
systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of the 
Mill’s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill’s views on the 
certainty of knowledge changed overtime and that this change was 
accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results 
yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later 
editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no 
longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific 
certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in 
establishing causal laws in a provisional way. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this essay, I establish two things: I (1) clarify how the late Mill 
conceived of the certainty of inductive generalizations and (2) offer a 
systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of the 
Canons of Induction. 
 I shall argue that Mill’s views on the certainty of 
knowledge changed overtime and that this change was accompanied 
by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the 
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Canons of Induction. In addition, I offer a systematic unravelling of 
the underlying presuppositions of Mill’s Canons of Induction and, in 
view of this, clarify the limited scope of Mill’s Canons. Nowhere do 
I assume that Mill’s A System of Logic provides an adequate theoretical 
account of induction and causation. One obvious objection is that 
Mill treats induction as intrinsically causal (and only considers 
deterministic causation). Also several of the presuppositions of Mill’s 
Canons do not apply to all forms of causation (see infra). 
Undoubtedly, Mill’s Canons remain heuristically valuable if we 
already have an idea of the possible causes relevant to an 
explanandum.1 
 Past interpreters of Mill have concluded that Mill thought 
that applications of the Canons establish causal laws beyond doubt. 
Alan Ryan for instance notes that Mill thought that experimental 
methods ‘are designed to prove natural laws to be true’ (1971, p. 
41), that Mill ‘has an almost Aristotelian tendency to identify 
generality and certainty’, that ‘he never ceases to stress the need to 
arrive at certain natural laws’ (1974, p. 80), and that the Canons of 
Induction are ‘supposed to show how we prove a hypothesis to be 
true’ (ibid.). R.P. Anschutz noted that Mill attempted to formulate a 
demonstrative theory of induction, which would produce ‘a perfect 
science both of natural bodies and of spiritual’ (1963 [1953], p. 111 
[emphasis in original]). While these statements apply to the early Mill, 
they do not to the late Mill. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Nagel 1950, p. xli. Nagel adds that although they require further 
factual assumptions, they nevertheless succeed in calling attention ‘to 
considerations that are indispensable in evaluating much empirical evidence’. Cf. 
Mackie’s conclusion: ‘In fact, these methods are constantly used, explicitly of 
implicitly, both to suggest causal hypotheses and to confirm them. One should 
not, of course, expect any methods of empirical enquiry to establish conclusions 
beyond all possibility of doubt or all need of refinement, but using these methods 
we can frequently say at least this: we have reason to suppose that for an event of 
this kind in this field [a set of background conditions] there is some cause, and if 
the cause is not such-and-such, we cannot see what else the cause may be.’ (1967, 
p. 332). 
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 The late Mill endorsed the view that the Canons generate 
revisable causal conclusions. This take on the Canons is in line with 
Mill’s later fallibilist epistemology (see Jacobs 1991). In a seminal 
paper, Struan Jacobs has rightfully argued that the rôle of the 
inductive Canons in Mill’s later meta-scientific view became 
restricted to criteria of inductive justification (by contrast, according 
to his earlier views, the Canons were also precepts of discovery) 
(ibid., p. 81).2 Jacobs’ account nuances the view defended by J. M. 
Robson, the editor of Mill’s Collected Works, who claims that the 
revisions in Mill’s System ‘do not […] reveal a shift in attitudes; 
rather, they typically consist of answers to opponents, or new 
illustrations of methods’ (1973, p. lxxvii).  
 Mill’s changing views on the certainty of knowledge can be 
gleaned from the revisions he made in various editions – as Mill 
never uniformly revised A System of Logic, the final version, quite 
inconsistently, contains both talk of absolute and provisional 
certainty/causes. For instance, in the press copy, the first edition and 
the second edition (1846), Mill wrote that we can consider 
inductions ‘as absolutely certain and absolutely universal’, that they 
attain ‘absolute certainty’, that sound inductions ‘amount to full 
proof’, and that inductions are based on previous ‘inductions of 
unquestionable certainty’, while in later editions he tempered these 
statements respectively into ‘quite certain and quite universal’, 
‘certainty’ tout court, ‘amount practically to proof’, and ‘inductions 
deserving of reliance’ (1843/1872, III.iv.3, III.iii.2, III.iv.2; 1973, p. 
322 (note n and p), p. 312 (note e), p. 319 (note g)). From the 1851 
edition onwards he replaced ‘different antecedents must be set down 
as distinct causes’ into ‘different antecedents must be set down 
                                                 
2 Cf. Johnson 1922, p. 200. Ernst Nagel pointed out that Mill’s failure to 
carefully differentiate between finding rules of discovery and funding general 
criteria of validity caused major confusion (Nagel’s introduction in 1950, p. 
xxxix). 
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provisionally as distinct causes’ (1843/1872, III.x.3; 1973, p. 439 
(note e)). 
 The early Mill aimed to establish absolutely certain 
knowledge. For instance, in the press copy manuscript (1842) Mill 
wrote on the Canons, as follows:  
 
So long as any doubt hung over this fundamental principle [the 
Law of Causality], the various Methods of Induction which took that 
principle for granted could only afford results which were admissibly 
conditionally; as showing what law the phenomena under 
investigation must follow if it is followed any fixed law at all. As, 
however, when the rules of correct induction had been conformed to, the 
result never failed to be verified by all subsequent experience; every such 
inductive operation had the effect of extending the acknowledged 
dominion of general laws, and bringing an additional portion of 
the experience of mankind to strengthen the evidence of the 
universality of the law of causation: until now at length we are 
fully warranted in considering that law, as applied to all 
phenomena within the range of human observation, to stand on 
equal footing in respect to evidence with the axioms of geometry 
itself. (1843/1872, III.xxi.3; 1973, p. 571 (note i) [emphasis 
added]) 
 
For Mill the Law of Causality was an absolute truth and, by 
consequence, the methods of induction based upon it provide results 
that are true and unconditional (and thus absolute). He insisted that 
inductions will never fail to be verified in future inquiry. Mill 
claimed that the Canons generate absolutely certain results: once 
applied, they yield unrevisable knowledge.3 This contrasts strongly 
with the late Mill who wrote the following in the 1872 edition: 
 
In matters of evidence, as in all other human things, we neither 
require, nor can attain, the absolute. We must hold even our 
strongest convictions with an opening left in our minds for the 
                                                 
3 Compare with the early draft of A System: ‘We have next to enquire into 
the nature and grounds of Induction; the conditions necessary to constitute a 
perfect, or conclusive Induction’ (1974, p. 1102). 
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reception of facts which contradict them; and only when we have 
taken this precaution, have we earned the right to act upon our 
convictions with complete confidence when no such contradiction 
appears. Whatever has been found true in innumerable instances, and 
never found to be false after due examination in any, we are safe in acting 
on as universal provisionally, until an undoubted exception could scarcely 
have escaped notion. (1843/1872, III.xxi.4; 1973, p. 574 [emphasis 
added]) 
 
It then comes as a natural consequence that the late Mill came to see 
the results harvested by the Canons of induction as revisable 
conclusions. Assurance that no exceptions will occur comes ‘in a 
very moderate degree’ (1843/1872, III.iii.2; 1973, p. 312). Mill 
became increasingly aware of the difficulties one encounters when 
trying to apply the Canons of Induction, i.e. he became increasingly 
aware that the highly idealized conditions that the Canons of 
Induction presuppose can hardly be met in the real world, in view of 
the Plurality of Causes and Intermixture of Effects (see infra).  
   
 
2. Mill’s System of Logic 
 
According to Scarre, J.S. Mill’s A System of Logic embodied ‘the 
greatest revolution in logical studies since Aristotle’ (1987, p. 1). 4 
As all scientific inference consists of inductions (i.e. inference to 
general propositions) or interpretations of inductions (i.e. inference to 
individual facts), clarifying ‘What induction is (…) and what 
conditions render it legitimate’ is, according to John S. Mill, ‘the 
main question of the science of logic’ (1843/1872, III.i.1; 1973, p. 
283). Logic is the judge of all particular investigations (1843/1872, 
Intro. §5; 1973, p. 10). Mill initially defined induction as the 
operation of discovering and proving general propositions 
                                                 
4 As I shall abstract here from the rôle of logic in Mill’s overall empiricist 
project, I refer the reader to Scarre’s study (1987, chapters 6-9). 
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(1843/1872, III.v.1; 1973, p. 325) ‘by which we infer that what we 
know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases 
which resemble the former in certain assignable respects’ 
(1843/1872, II.ii.1; 1973, p. 288). After Whewell’s objections to 
the Canons of Induction he presented them as methods of proof only 
(Courtney 1889, p. 82). 
 General conceptions obtained by induction derive from 
observation only and are in the facts (1843/1872, IV.i.2; 1974, pp. 
650-653). They are neither pre-existent nor constructed by the mind 
out of its own materials (1843/1872, II.ii.4; 1973, p. 296).5 Logic is 
concerned with inference, not with intuitive truths (1843/1872, 
Intro. §4; 1973, p. 6). According to Mill the Logic of Induction is a 
Universal Logic: it applies to every day life as well as scientific 
reasoning. In both cases the process is essentially the same. Mill 
speaks of a general proposition in cases where a predicate is affirmed 
or denied of an unlimited number of phenomena (1843/1872, I.v.1, 
III.ii.2; 1973, p. 89, p. 289). More generally, induction is ‘inferring 
a proposition from propositions less general than itself’ (1843/1872, 
II.i.3; 1973, p. 162), so that the conclusion contains more 
information than what was originally contained in the premises. Mill 
noted that accepting a generalization meant that ‘the falsity of the 
generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causation’ 
(1865/1866[1969], p. 293). 6 
To Mill’s contemporaries, the distinction between deduction 
and induction was not as straightforward as it is today, neither was it 
a communis opinio that true inference, expressed by real propositions, 
is inductive and that deduction, expressed by ‘verbal’ propositions, is 
                                                 
5 No Whewellian super-induction is required (1843/1872, III.ii.4-5; 1973, 
pp. 294-305. For a critical survey of the Mill-Whewell debate, see Snyder 1997 
and Snyder 2006. 
6 Between 1841 and 1946 Comte and Mill corresponded intensely (see 
Leroux 1877). Mill’s canons are only cursory mentioned by Comte (ibid., pp. 199-
200; see also: Guillin 2007, pp. 14-18 [the author is indebted to Vincent Guillin 
for this reference]. 
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only apparent inference.7 Real propositions report on matters of fact 
(e.g. ‘Archbishop Whately died at 10 p.m.’), while verbal 
propositions report on the meaning of terms (e.g. ‘humans are 
mortal’). On Mill’s account, ‘the business of Inductive Logic is to 
provide rules and models (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for 
ratiocination) to which if inductive arguments conform, those 
arguments are conclusive, and not otherwise’ (1843/1872, III.ix.6; 
1973, p. 430). He clearly aimed at a normative theory of induction. 
In the introduction to A System of Logic Mill added: ‘I do not attempt 
to decompose the mental operations in question into their ultimate 
elements. It is enough of the analysis as far as it goes is correct, and if 
it goes far enough for practical purposes’ (1843/1872, III. Intro. §7; 
1973, p. 12).8 The key issue is namely to clarify why a single instance, 
in some cases, is sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, 
a myriad of concurring instances, cannot establish a single universal 
proposition (1843/1872, III.iii.3; 1973, p. 314). Mill’s point of 
departure was the observation that in the course of the history of 
science we have established inductions: ‘it is because there are such, 
that a Logic of Induction is possible’ (1843/1872, III.iv.3; 1973, p. 
322 [emphasis added]). Mill often stressed that the formulation of the 
Logic of Induction presupposes sufficient knowledge about the actual 
history of science – in this respect he was, as he himself admitted 
(1843/1872, III.i.2; 1973, p. 284 (note c)), less qualified than 
William Whewell who knew the history of science intimately as his 
History of the Inductive Sciences (first edition: 1837) testifies. One of 
the chief goals of logic is to ascertain whether a belief is well founded 
and to judge evidence. As Mill wrote in a draft version of his System: 
‘The province of Logic is not the evidence itself, but the operation of 
                                                 
7  See especially Scarre 1987, pp. 15ff. According to Richard Whately, 
induction was a deduction from instances (1849 [1826], pp. 253-254). According 
to Augustus De Morgan, complete induction yielded demonstrative knowledge, 
while ‘normal’ induction yielded only probable knowledge (1847, p. 211). 
8  Cf. Mill’s Inaugural Delivered in the University of St. Andrews, in 
1867/1867[1984], pp. 237-240. 
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the understanding in judging the evidence’ (1974, p. 965, cf. p. 967). 
9  Logic is the test of our reasoning, it is ‘the Science of the 
Conditions of Correct Reasoning’ (1865/1867[1979], p. 361) (or ars 
artium, as Mill sometimes referred to it). In Chapter VIII, entitled 
‘Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry’, of Book III on 
induction Mill described the four ‘only possible modes of 
experimental inquiry’, which ‘compose the available resources of the 
human mind for ascertaining the laws of succession of phenomena’ 
(1843/1872, III.viii.7; 1973, p. 406). 
The ground of induction is the Axiom of the Uniformity of 
Nature, the ‘ultimate major’ in our inductive reasoning (1843/1872, 
III.iii.1; 1973, p. 308), which is derived from enumerative induction 
(1843/1872, III.iii.1; 1973, pp. 306-307). This Axiom is not 
universally true, since the course of nature is not always uniform 
(1843/1872, III.iii.2; 1973, p. 311). Yet ‘it is enough that it 
pervades the particular class of phenomena to which the induction 
relates’ (1843/1872, III.iii.1; 1973, p. 310).  Mill noted that we can 
only have assurance of it ‘in a very moderate degree’ (1843/1872, 
III.iii.2; 1973, p. 312). Scarre has noted that Mill was being 
inconsistent and ‘seems not to have grasped what Hume’s problem 
was’ (1998, p. 116)10. Leaving this issue aside, according to Mill, 
there was no paradox in his criticism of enumerative induction and 
his acceptance of enumerative induction as the foundation of the 
uniformity of nature (see Ryan 1974, p. 83).11 He asserted that ‘we 
are justified in the seeming inconsistency, of holding induction by 
simple enumeration to be good for proving this general truth, the 
foundation of scientific induction, and yet refusing to rely on it for 
any of the narrower inductions’ (1843/1872, III.iii.3; 1973, p. 571) 
and that ‘the major premise [the uniformity of nature] is not the proof of 
                                                 
9 Cf. Mill to Thomas Carlyle, 2 March 1834 (Mill 1812/1848[1963], vol. 
12, p. 219). For a convincing psychologistic reading the deductive logic of Mill, 
see Godden 2005.  
10 Cf. Scarre 1987, p. 87, pp. 100-103. 
11 Cf. 1843/1872, III.iv.3, III.xxi.1-2; 1973, p. 320, pp. 563-568. 
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the conclusion, but is itself proved, along with the conclusion from the same 
evidence’ (1843/1872, III.xxi.4; 1973, p. 572 [emphasis added]). 
         Mill’s theory of induction was based on his concept of cause: 
 
The notion of Cause being the root of the whole theory of 
Induction, it is indispensable that this idea should, at the very 
outset of our inquiry be, with the utmost practicable degree of 
precision, fixed and determined. (1843/1872, III.v.2; 1973, p. 
326) 
 
A cause is the assemblage of its (physical and proximate) conditions 
(1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, pp. 326-327). Mill noted that it is 
seldom that a single antecedent causes a consequent: 
 
It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single 
antecedent, that this invariable sequence subsists. It is usually 
between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the 
concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, that is, 
to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such 
cases it is very common to single out one only of the 
antecedents under the denomination of Cause, calling the 
others merely Conditions. Thus, if a person eats of a particular 
dish, and dies in consequence, that is, would not have died if he 
had not eaten of it, people would be apt to say that eating of 
that dish was the cause of his death. There needs not, however, 
be any invariable connexion between eating of the dish and 
death; but there certainly is, among the circumstances which 
took place, some combination or other on which death is 
invariably consequent: as, for instance, the act of eating of the 
dish, combined with a particular bodily constitution, a 
particular state of present health, and perhaps even a certain 
state of the atmosphere; the whole of which circumstances 
perhaps constituted in this particular case the conditions of the 
phenomenon, or, in other words, the set of antecedents which 
determined it, and but for which it would not have happened. 
(1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, pp. 327-328)  
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‘Philosophically speaking’ we have ‘no right to give the name of 
cause to one of them, exclusively of the others’ (1843/1872, III.v.3; 
1973, p. 328). According to Mill, the eating of the dish is an event, 
i.e. an instantaneous change or succession of instantaneous change, 
while the various other conditions are states possessing more or less 
of permanency. Note that Mill never formulated a criterion for 
instantaneous changes. 
Mill considers the cause of a phenomenon as the sum or 
assemblage of all conditions either (i) required to produce the 
consequent (or effect) or (ii) without which it would not have 
happened (1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, pp. 327-328). By (i) C ⊃ E 
obtains and by (ii) not-C ⊃ not-E (equivalent to E ⊃ C) obtains. Mill 
conceived of nature as a web composed of distinct threads 
(1843/1872, III.iv.1; 1973, p. 318). A cause is, according to Mill, an 
unconditional invariable antecedent, i.e. an antecedent which 
produces its effect invariably and is unconditional upon any other 
antecedent.12  
 
 
3. The Presuppositions of Mill’s Canons 
 
Here we unravel the presuppositions of Mill’s Canons of Induction. I 
shall use formal expressions to do so. Contrary to previous 
attempts 13 , I aim to stay as close as possible to Mill’s original 
proposal. J.L. Mackie has suggested that there is not one method of 
agreement, one method of difference, but a series of variants of each 
(1967, p. 325). One can certainly develop variants of Mill’s methods, 
but Mill himself never did so. Moreover, he stressed quite strongly 
                                                 
12 See Mackie 1980, p. 83 for a counterexample. Consider the case where 
C is a common cause of A (at t1) and B at (t1+n): nothing prevents A from being a 
cause of B. 
13  See Schock 1965, pp. 235-240 and Czerwinski 1960 [the author is 
indebted to Diego L. Rosende for these references]. 
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that ‘[t]he four methods which it has now been attempted to describe, 
are the only possible modes of experimental inquiry – of direct 
induction à posteriori, as distinguished from deduction: at least, I 
know not, nor am able to imagine, any others’ (1843/1872, III.viii.7; 
1973, p. 406). Here I deal with Mill’s original formulations not with 
the variants later added by Mackie. It should be kept in mind that no 
full-blown logic of Millian induction is provided, only a formalization 
of the inference rules of Mill’s Canons of Induction as a means of 
elucidating.  
 The first method is the Method of Agreement:  
 
FIRST CANON 
 
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only 
one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all instances 
agree, is the cause (or effect14) of the given phenomenon. (1843/1872, 
III.viii.1; 1973, p. 390) 
 
Suppose that A occurs together with BC (and that the corresponding 
consequent is abc) and that, next, A occurs together with DE (and 
that the corresponding consequent is ade). Then we may reason that b 
and c are not consequences of A (for they were not present in ade) 
and similarly for d and e. For instance, suppose that two individuals 
had a different lunch but that the wine they drank was mixed with a 
high dose of poison so that both died shortly after lunchtime. By the 
Method of Agreement we can then conclude that the poison in the 
wine caused their death. By applying the Method of Agreement we 
cannot establish joint causes (which conflicts with Mill’s definition of 
cause as an assemblage of conditions; see infra), for it is assumed that 
two phenomena have only one circumstance in common. 
Furthermore, once we have established a single common 
                                                 
14 Here Mill considers the direction of the causal relation purely logically, 
i.e. without reference to a time function, so that without a time ordering X can be 
the cause of Y or conversely.  
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circumstance, we stop looking for other potential common 
circumstances. 
 In order to shed more light on the presuppositions of Mill’s 
Canons, I shall present them in a more formalized version. First of all, 
we need to introduce a function ƒ, which assigns instants of time tn 
to the observed components (c’s) of a ‘Millian phenomenon’ (a 
definition of a Millian phenomenon is spelled out in just a moment) 
according to their succession in time (cf. Mill 1843/1872, III.v.2; 
1973, p. 327).  Correspondingly,  
 
(∀c) (∃ tn) ƒ: c ↦ tn,  
 
where tn ∈ + (the set of non-negative integers starting from 0) and 
tn < tn+z. The idea is that f assigns instants in time to all c’s according 
to their order of occurrence. In order to render Mill’s First Canon, 
which is based on the intuition that whatever antecedent can be 
absent notwithstanding the occurrence of the consequent is not a 
cause of this phenomenon (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, p. 390), 
explicit I define a Millian phenomenon (‘phenomenon x at time tn’) 
as a set of components or circumstances15: 
 
px
tn =df {c1
tn, c2
tn,  …, cm
 tn} 
 
Mill noted that the axiom ‘implied’ in this method is: that whatever 
consequent can be excluded, with no other difference in the 
antecedents than the absence of a particular one, is the effect of that 
antecedent (1843/1872, III.viii.2; 1973, p. 391). 
 The First Canon, which has as its target necessary conditions 
but is ‘not competent to prove causation’ (1843/1872, III.ix.4; 1973, 
p. 423), can be expressed formally as follows (where ‘→’ means ‘is 
                                                 
15  Correspondingly, I shall not follow Mill’s convention to denote 
antecedents and consequents by means of capitals and small caps respectively, 
which I find less accurate for my present purposes. 
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the cause of’; the bar means ‘we can inductively and provisionally 
conclude from the above’; ‘∨’ refers to the exclusive disjunction; ‘∧’ 
to the conjunction; ‘∪’ to the union of two sets, and ‘¬’ to the 
absence of a component or a causal relation): 
 
[Method of Agreement.]16 
 
(1) p1
tn ∧ (p1
tn = {c1
tn, c2
tn, …, cm
tn}) 
 
(2) p1
tn+z ∧ (p1
tn+z = {c'1
tn+z, c'2
tn+z, …, c'm
tn+z}) 
 
(3) p2
tn ∧ (p2
tn = {c1
tn, cβ
tn, …, cκ
tn }) 
 
(4) p2
tn+z ∧ (p2
tn+z = {c'1
tn+z, c'β
tn+z, …, c'κ
tn+z }) 
 
 
c1
tn
  → c’1
tn+z  
 
Some explanation here: by ‘'’ I refer to the fact that c'x is the 
consequent of cx and by ‘{c1, c2, …, cm}’/‘{c1, cβ, …, 
cκ}’[voetnoot verwijderd] I use different subscripts to denote 
different c’s. If only one circumstance remains, it is the (necessary) 
cause17 we are in search of (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, p. 390). The 
Method of Agreement remains subject to considerable doubt, Mill 
stressed, which arises ‘from the impossibility of assuring ourselves 
that A is the only immediate antecedent common to both instances’ 
(1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, p. 390) – i.e. as A might be found by 
                                                 
16 For simplicity’s sake I assume that we observe two different phenomena 
at the same time. 
17  If A (antecedent) is a necessary condition of C (consequent), then 
whenever C is present A is present. Hence, if C was present while A was absent, 
then A is not a necessary condition of C. We observe that the antecedents c2, …, 
cm
 / cβ, …, cκ
 can be absent despite the occurrence of c'1. In this case, none of 
these are necessary conditions – thus, they are ‘eliminated’ as causes. As c1 is the 
only remaining condition, it follows that c1 is a necessary condition of c1'. 
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accident (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, pp. 388-389), it may turn out 
that A is merely an invariable antecedent but not an unconditional 
one. 18 Mill added that ‘[t]he conclusions which that [method] yields, 
when the number of instances compared is small, are of no real value, 
except as, in the character of suggestions’ (1843/1872, III.x.2; 1973, 
p. 436). 
 The Second Canon suffers from this problem to a lesser 
extent, Mill claimed, for by artificially producing or preventing A we 
are more certain that A is an unconditional antecedent.19 It is based 
on the axiom that whatever antecedent cannot be excluded without 
preventing the phenomenon, is the cause, or a condition, of that 
phenomenon (1843/1872, III.viii.2; 1973, p. 391). Mill’s 
formulation of it is: 
 
SECOND CANON 
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and 
an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common 
save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which 
alone the two instances differ, is the effect 20  or the cause, or an 
indispensable 21  part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (1843/1872, 
III.viii.2; 1973, p. 391) 
 
If we, for instance, observe ABC and its consequent abc and ABC and 
its consequent abc, we may infer that A is the cause of a, for when A 
was not present a did not occur. Suppose that we investigate an 
                                                 
18  For further problems with this Canon, see the amusing case of the 
‘scientific drinker’ (Cornish 1997, p. 65). 
19
 Mill observed: ‘It is, however, much easier to analyse completely a set 
of arrangements made by ourselves, than the whole complex mass of the agencies 
which nature happens to be exerting at the moment of the production of a given 
phenomenon. We may overlook some of the material circumstances in an 
experiment with an electrical machine; but we shall, at the worst, be better 
acquainted with them than with those of a thunder-storm.’ (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 
1973, p. 390). 
20 See footnote 14.  
21 I.e., ‘necessary’ (1843/1872, III.viii.2; 1973, p. 391 (note f)). 
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electrical circuit. If we turn the switch we observe that a light bulb is 
lighted; if we do not turn the switch the bulb is not lighted. By the 
Method of Difference we may conclude that, other things being 
equal, the turning of the switch is the cause of the lightening of the 
bulb. 
Mill’s Method of Difference requires that one and the same 
antecedent was present before the positive instance of the 
consequent and absent before the negative instance of the 
consequent. The Second Canon which has as its target a sufficient 
cause22, can be formalised, as follows: 
 
[Method of Difference.] 
  
(1) p1
tn ∧ (p1
tn = {c1
tn, c2
tn, …, cm
tn}) 
 
(2) p1
tn+z ∧ (p1
tn+z = {c'1
tn+z, c'2
tn+z, …, c'm
tn+z}) 
 
(3) p2
tn ∧ (p2
tn = {¬c1
tn, c2
tn,  …, cm
 tn}) 
 
(4) p2
tn+z ∧ (p2
tn+z = {¬c'1
tn+z, c'2
tn+z,  …, c'm
tn+z}) 
 
 
(c1
tn
 → c’1
tn+z) ∨ ((C ∪ {c1
tn}) → c’1
tn+z)  
 
However, Mill’s Canons suffer from two fundamental drawbacks. 
First, as the Method of Difference only establishes single antecedents 
as causes, it cannot accommodate cases of Intermixture of Effects 
(see infra). Furthermore, joint causes are not derivable. Secondly, on 
the assumption that negatives cannot produce change, AB → a, for 
                                                 
22 If A is a sufficient condition of C, then whenever A is present C is present. 
Hence, if A is present while C is absent, then A is not a sufficient condition of C. 
We observe that c2, …, cm
 can be present while c'1
  is absent. In this case, none of 
these components are sufficient conditions – thus, they are ‘eliminated’ as causes. 
As c1 is the only remaining condition, it follows that c1 is a sufficient condition of 
c'1.  
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instance, never obtains. Mill wrote that ‘every fact or phenomenon 
which has a beginning, invariably arises when some certain 
combination of positive facts exists, provided certain other positive facts 
do not exist (1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, p. 330 [emphasis added]). 
Furthermore, Mill’s Method of Difference a fortiori excludes both 
simultaneous causation (1843/1872, III.v.8; 1973, p. 344), which 
maintains when cause and effect occur contemporaneously, and 
permanent causation, which refers to causal factors which cannot be 
eliminated – the exclusion of such cases is, by the way, obvious in 
view of Mill’s distinction between uniformities of succession and 
uniformities of coexistence (the former refer to phenomena that are 
directly causally related; the later refer to phenomena that are 
produced by a common cause) (1843/1872, III.v.1; 1973, p. 323). 
         Although the Method of Difference, which is a method of 
artificial experiment, is ‘a still more potent instrument of the 
investigation of nature’ (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, p. 390) than 
the Method of Agreement, which we employ in cases where 
experimentation is impossible, it is by no means waterproof, as Mill 
noted: 
 
If we could be certain of having ascertained all the invariable 
antecedents [by the Method of Agreement], we might be sure that 
the unconditional invariable antecedent; or cause, must be found 
somewhere among them. Unfortunately, it is hardly ever possible 
to ascertain all the antecedents, unless the phenomenon is one in 
which we can produce artificially. Even then, the difficulty is 
merely lightened, not removed. (1843/1872, III.viii.1; 1973, p. 
390) 
 
In the spontaneous operations of nature there is generally such 
complication and such obscurity, they are mostly either on so 
overwhelmingly large or on so inaccessibly minute a scale, we are 
ignorant of a great part of the facts which really take place, and 
even of those which we are not ignorant are so multitudinous, and 
therefore so seldom exactly alike in any two cases, that a 
spontaneous experiment, of the kind required by the Method of 
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Difference, is commonly not to be found. (1843/1872, III.viii.3; 
1973, pp. 392-393) 
 
If we can successfully apply the Method of Difference to an 
artificially produced experiment, we have ascertained at least one 
invariable antecedent or consequent, ‘however many other 
invariable antecedents or consequents may still remain 
unascertained’ (1843/1872, III.viii.3; 1973, pp. 393-394). In such 
manner, a ‘progressive localization of a cause’ is obtainable (Mackie 
1980, p. 72). 
 It should be noted that – and this was not sufficiently 
stressed (although at some times implicitly assumed (e.g. Mill 
1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, p. 328)) by Mill himself –that we cannot 
say that we have derived that A is the cause of d universally, but 
rather that A is the cause of d, under condition BC (Hobhouse 1890, p. 
259). J.L. Mackie also stressed this by calling attention to the notion 
of a ‘(causal) field’, i.e. a set of specifiable background conditions: 
‘[t]he causal field in this sense is not itself even part of a cause, but is 
rather a background against which the causing goes on’ (1980, p. 63). 
According to Mackie, (Millian) causes are what make the difference 
in relation to some background or causal field (ibid., p. xi). For 
instance, when we attempt to explain a disease we are not concerned 
not with the cause of disease in general, but with what causes disease 
in human beings on earth, breathing air, eating food, etc (ibid., p. 
325). 
 Mill concluded that the Method of Difference is the sole 
method by which we can ‘arrive with certainty at causes’ 
(1843/1872, III.viii.3; 1973, p. 394). A single instance eliminating 
some antecedent is of more value than the greatest multitude of 
instances. From at least 1862, Mill became aware of the most 
important limitations and difficulties of his Canons: they assumed 
that every effect is ‘connected exclusively with a single cause, that 
every fact is incapable of being mixed and confounded with another 
coexistent effect’ ((1843/1872, III.x.1; 1973, p. 434) and that the 
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reduction of phenomena to formulae is an obvious given.23 In similar 
vein, he wrote that the Inductive Sciences ‘in virtue of the peculiar 
character of one indispensable portion of the general formulæ 
according to which their inductions are made, [are also] Hypothetical 
Sciences. Their conclusions are only true on certain suppositions, 
which are, or ought to be, approximations to the truth, but are 
seldom, if ever, exactly true’ ((1843/1872, III.vi.1; 1973, p. 253). 
Ab initio the Canons suppose that we are given a finite set of 
enumerable alternatives. Mill’s Canons suppose ‘an ideal analysis of 
the evidence for inductive conclusions’ (Nagel 1950, p. xli). 
 Plurality of Causes renders the Method of Agreement 
uncertain, since we assume that the circumstance shared in both 
consequents must have been produced in both instances by the same 
cause (1843/1872, III.x.2; 1973, p. 435). Intermixture of Effects, 
where different causes are not ‘separately producing each its own 
effects, but interfering with or modifying the effects of the other’ 
(1843/1872, III.x.4; 1973, p. 440), makes the Method of Difference 
‘entirely unavailing’, since other causes than the one established have 
been operating during the transition (1843/1872, III.x.8; 1973, p. 
451). In such cases the Inverse Deductive Method, in which one deduces 
what should happen in complex cases from what is known about 
simple cases and then inductively tests these deductions, is the only 
option. Mill uses the composition of forces in mechanics as an 
analogy. Mill ignores the relations by which complex cases are built 
up from the simple cases (i.e. he assumes that Intermixture of Effects 
does not occur) and thinks of the inference as an instance of what is 
now called the deductive rule of conjunction, whereas one needs a 
                                                 
23  See e.g. Venn 1907 [1889], pp. 416-417, Laurie 1893, p. 324 and 
Whewell 2001 [1860], vol. 7, p. 263. In 1957 the assistant editor of Science, Joseph 
Turner, commented on Mill’s canons, as follows: ‘Of course, given a set of 
variables, A, B, C, and D, you can examine mechanically all possible combinations 
in search for invariable relationships. But to decide in the first place what variables 
are relevant to the problem requires an insight for which no rules are available.’ 
(1957, p. 431). 
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special empirical law (often called a ‘composition law’) which takes 
account of the relations among the parts in the complex cases. The 
Inverse Deductive Method consists of three consecutive stages: (i) a 
first stage in which the laws of (concurrent) cause are ascertained by 
the four methods discussed previously, (ii) a second stage, in which it 
is determined from the laws of the causes what effect any given 
combination of those causes will produce (by a deductive rule of 
conjunction), and (iii) a third stage in which the deduction obtained 
in (ii) are verified (1843/1872, III.xi.1-3; 1973, pp. 454-563). The 
Hypothetical Method consists of only (ii) and (iii) (1843/1872, 
III.xiv.4; 1973, p. 492). Mill wrote: 
 
In general, the laws of causes on which the effect depends may be 
obtained by an induction from comparatively simple instances, or, at the 
worst, by deduction from the laws of simpler causes, so obtained. By 
simple instances are meant, of course, those in which the action of 
each cause was not intermixed or interfered with, or not to any 
great extent, by other causes whose laws were unknown. And 
only when the induction which furnished the premises to the 
Deductive Method rested on such instances, has the application of 
such a method to the ascertainment of the laws of a complex 
effect, been attended with brilliant results. (1843/1872, III.xi.1; 
1973, p. 458 [emphasis added]) 
         
On a more abstract level, the Canons further presupposes that: (i) 
antecedents and consequents are correlated deterministically (= the 
principle of determinism24), (ii) the true antecedent is among those we 
have examined (= the principle of limited variety), (iii) backwards 
causation is impossible, and, finally, (iv) an event ontology, in which 
it is supposed that (iv.i) pure negatives cannot be considered as 
                                                 
24  Charles M. Douglas stated: ‘Induction goes on the supposition that 
everything is completely caused, or is ideally capable of being presented as an 
effect or product of conditions.’ (1888, p. 68). Mill accepted the Law of 
Causation, according to which whatever has a beginning has a cause, as valid 
(1843/1872, III.v.1; 1973, p. 325). Cause and effect do not need to be 
contiguous (1843/1872, III.xiv.6; 1973, p. 505). 
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causes, (iv.ii) there is no Intermixture of Effects (in other words, it is 
assumed that an effect is always compounded homogeneously so that 
a joint effect is composed of the sum of the separate effects 
(1843/1872, III.vi.3; 1973, p. 376)) and (iv.iii) there is no Plurality 
of Causes (i.e. that the same effect is always caused by the same 
cause).25 Mill noted that a cause philosophically speaking is the sum 
of the positive and negative conditions taken jointly (1843/1872, 
III.v.3; 1973, p. 332). These negative conditions may be denoted by 
a single term: ‘the absence of preventing or counteracting causes’ 
(ibid.). Note that Mill stressed that ‘From nothing, from a mere 
negation, no consequences can proceed’ (1843/1872, III.v.3; 1973, 
p. 330). Both the Method of Difference and the Method of 
Agreement assume that a single consequent (effect) is produced by a 
single antecedent (cause) – this assumption is in conflict with Mill’s 
definition of a cause as an assemblage of conditions (cf. 1843/1872, 
III.x.1; 1973, p. 434). From the 1862 edition onwards, Mill seems 
to be aware of that, since he added: ‘The cause indeed may not be 
simple; it may consist of an assemblage of conditions; but we have 
supposed that there was only one possible assemblage of conditions, 
from which the given effect could result’ (1843/1872, III.x.1; 1973, 
p. 434). 
 Some phenomena do not allow the antecedents to be 
separated from each other. In such cases, we turn to the Joint 
Method of Agreement and Difference or the Indirect Method of 
Difference: 
 
THIRD CANON 
 
If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one 
circumstance in common while two or more instances in which it does not 
occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the 
                                                 
25  See 1843/1872, III.v.7-9; 1973, pp. 342-348. Mackie notes: ‘our 
reasoning does not (…) exclude factors as irrelevant, but positively locates some at 
least of the relevant factors within the differentiating cluster’ (1980, p. 72). 
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circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or 
the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 
(1843/1872, III.viii.4; 1973, p. 396) 
 
This method is an improvement of the Method of Agreement, but it 
does not participate in ‘the more cogent nature of the Method of 
Difference’ (ibid.), since the requisitions of the Method of Difference 
are not met. This method can be formalized by a combination of the 
formalizations I have provided earlier. 
 The Canons discussed above are guidelines for the 
establishment of causes. The Fourth assumes that we have 
established some causes. The Method of Residues, a modification of 
the Method of Difference, goes as follows: 
 
FOURTH CANON 
 
Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous 
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the 
phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents. (1843/1872, 
III.viii.5; 1973, p. 398) 
 
When we have established, by previous inductions founded on the 
Method of Difference, that certain consequents of a phenomenon are 
the effects of certain corresponding antecedents, we may conclude 
that the remaining consequents are caused by some yet unknown 
antecedents. This method is ‘the most fertile in unexpected results’, 
because it draws our attention to ‘sequences in which neither the 
cause nor the effect were sufficiently conspicuous to attract 
themselves the attention of observers’ (ibid.). Suppose we observe 
the behaviour of a metal rod. Suppose that we try to explain the 
behaviour of the rod by the law of universal gravitation and that we 
notice that the motion of the rod differs from the predictions by the 
law of universal gravity. The residual motion of the rod, i.e. the 
motion superadded to its gravitational motion, then needs to be 
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explained by (an) additional force(s). The residual motion equals the 
overall effect minus the gravitational effect. Formally: 
 
[Method of Residues.] 
(1) p1
tn = {c1
tn, c2
tn, …,cm
tn} 
(2) p1
tn+z = {c’1
tn+z, c’2
tn+z, … , c’m
tn+z} 
(3) c1
tn
 → c’1
tn+z  
 
 
{c2
tn, …,cm
tn} → {c’2
tn+z, … , c’m
tn+z}26 
 
This Canon assumes the compositionality of causes: the joint effect 
of causes is the sum of separate effects (1843/1872, III.vi.2; 1973, p. 
373). In his Autobiography Mill wrote that, by early 1830: ‘On 
examining, accordingly, what the mind does when it applies the 
principle of the Composition of Forces, I found that it performs a 
simple act of addition. It adds the separate effect of the one force to 
the separate effect of the other, and puts down the sum of these 
separate effects as the joint effect. But is this is a legitimate process? 
In dynamics, and in all mathematical branches of physics, it is; but in 
some other cases, as in chemistry, it is not; and I then recollected 
that something not unlike this was pointed out as one of the 
distinctions between chemical and mechanical phenomena, in the 
introduction to that favourite of my boyhood Thomson’s System of 
Chemistry 27 . (…) I now saw, that a science is either deductive or 
experimental, according as, in the province it deals with, the effects of causes 
when conjoined, are or are not the sums of the effects which the same causes 
                                                 
26 In future research, one can potentially establish which antecedent is the 
necessary or sufficient cause of a certain consequent by resorting to the Method of 
Agreement or the Method of Difference, respectively.   
27 The reference Mill refers to can be found in Thomson 1810, pp. 2-3. He 
first read this work in 1816. 
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produce when separate.’ (Cockshut 1992, p. 87 [emphasis added]).28 As 
noted previously, the preceding Canons cannot deal with Permanent 
Causes, i.e. ‘indestructible natural agents, which it is impossible 
either to exclude or to isolate’ (1843/1872, III.viii.6; 1973, p. 398). 
In such cases, we must turn to the Method of Concomitant 
Variations, which applies to uniform29 variations of quantity only:  
 
FIFTH CANON 
 
Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another 
phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an 
effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of 
causation. (1843/1872, III.viii.6; 1973, p. 401) 
 
The Canon is based in the premise that the cause and effect are 
always proportional. Suppose we observe that a linear increase of a 
variable is always accompanied by the same linear increase of another 
variable (or that the linear decrease of a variable is always 
accompanied by the same linear decrease of another variable). In this 
case there are three options: the first variable causes the second, the 
second is the cause of the second, or both are dependent on an 
unknown common cause. Formally this can be formulated as follows, 
where i.y stand for a quantity (pertaining to a circumstance) being 
increased by a factor and i/y stands for a quantity being decreased by 
a factor: 
 
[Method of Concomitant Variation.] 
(1) p1
tn ∧ p1
tn = {c1(i)
tn, c2
tn, …,  cm
tn} 
(2) p2
tn ∧ p2
tn = {c1(j)
tn, cβ
tn, …, cκ
tn}, where i and j are 
quantitative measures of one component of two different 
phenomena, respectively 
                                                 
28 See further: Hausman 1995. 
29 Cf. 1843/1872, III.viii.6; 1973, p. 402. 
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(3) (c 1(i.y)
tn+z ∧ c1(j.y)
tn+z) ∨ (c1(i/y)
tn+z ∧ c1(j/y)
tn+z), where y ≥ 2 
 
 
(c1(i)
tn → (c1(j.y)
tn+z ∨ c1(j/y)
tn+z)) ∨ (c1(j)
tn → (c1(i.y)
tn+z ∨ c1(i/y)
tn+z)) ∨ 
((∃Ctn) → ((c1(i.y)tn+z ∧ c1(j.y)tn+z) ∨ (c1(i/y)tn+z ∧ c1(j/y)tn+z))), 
where C is a yet undiscovered common cause 
 
By (3) we denote that when quantity i changes (diminishes of 
increases) j does so accordingly. So both quantities are multiplied or 
divided by the same factor. This factor cannot be 0 or 1. ‘c1(i)
tn → 
(c1(j.y)
tn+z ∨ c1(j/y)
tn+z)’ expresses that c1(i)
tn is the cause of the changes in 
j, ‘c1(j)
tn → (c1(i.y)
tn+z ∨ c1(i/y)
tn+z)’ that c1(j)
tn is the cause of the changes 
in i, and ‘(∃Ctn) → ((c1(i.y)tn+z ∧ c1(j.y)tn+z) ∨ (c1(i/y)tn+z ∧ c1(j/y)tn+z))’ that 
the changes in i and j are caused by a yet unknown common cause.  
 
 
4. In Conclusion 
 
On the condition that the cause under consideration is not a 
permanent cause, it can potentially be dealt with by the Method of 
Agreement, the Method of Difference of the Joint Method of 
Agreement and Difference. Only these methods – among them the 
Method of Difference being the most certain as it presupposes an 
artificial experiment – potentially establish causal relations. The 
Method of Residues only narrows down the set of possible causes – 
without being able to point out a single potential causal factor. It can 
only be applied when we have already established at least one causal 
relation by the Method of Difference (hence the arrow directed at 
the Method of Residues). If the cause under the consideration is a 
permanent cause and if it involves linear quantitative changes then 
only the Method of Concomitant Variation is at hand. The procedure 
of applying Mill’s Canons can schematically be represented as follows: 
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 If the conditions under which inductive generalisations are 
valid (e.g. limited variety, no plurality of causes, no intermixture of 
effects, etc.) do not apply or if anomalies occur, conclusions derived 
from the Canons of Induction no longer follow. In other words, if we 
have reason to believe that the conditions (under which causal 
generalisation hold) are not violated and that we have not recorded 
an exception to our inductive generalisation we are justified in 
provisionally accepting the results inferred by the Canons of 
Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic 
as conceived by the late Mill was, I take it, not that by the Canons of 
Induction we can establish scientific certainty, but rather that they 
are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. 
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